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Cumulative prospect theory introduced the weighting of probabilities as an additional component to capturerisk attitudes. However, this addition would be a less signiﬁcant challenge to expected utility theory (EU)
if utility curvature and probability weighting showed strong positive correlation. In that case the utility curva-
ture in EU alone, although not properly describing risky behavior in general, would still capture most of the
variance of individual risk aversion. This study provides experimental evidence that such a strong and positive
correlation does not exist. Although most individuals exhibit concave utility and convex probability weighting,
the two components show no strong positive correlation.
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1. Introduction
In expected utility theory (hereafter EU), the attitude
toward risk originates from changes in marginal util-
ity (i.e., the curvature of the utility function). As a
result, risk attitudes are traditionally captured by ﬁt-
ting the best EU model and then using the individ-
ual utility curvature as the sole index of risk attitude.
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) demonstrated vari-
ous empirical deﬁciencies of that view. In (cumu-
lative) prospect theory (hereafter PT) they added a
second component to assess risk attitudes, namely
the weighting of probabilities. Wakker (1994) gave
an intuitive interpretation on the distinct roles that
these two components play in the assessment of risk
attitudes: utility describes an intrinsic appreciation of
money prior to probability or risk, whereas risk atti-
tude originates from the perception of probabilities.
Studies testing PT or measuring these two com-
ponents of risk attitudes are abundant (see, e.g.,
Harrison and Rutström 2008 for a review). Yet to the
best of our knowledge, no study has so far addressed
the relation between these two components. Previ-
ous literature has either been silent on this relation
or implicitly assumed independence. Addressing this
question is, however, important, because PT would
pose a less signiﬁcant challenge to EU if the two
components, utility curvature and probability weight-
ing, were signiﬁcantly and positively correlated (more
concave in utility corresponds to more underweight-
ing in probability). In that case, one could argue
that the utility curvature in EU—although not prop-
erly describing risk behavior in general—would still
capture most of the variance regarding degrees of
risk aversion, making the other component of risk
redundant.
In this study we investigate the relation between
these two components of risk. Are they truly uncon-
nected? Can an individual be risk seeking in one com-
ponent and risk averse in the other? Results from
our controlled laboratory experiment suggest that this
may well be the case. Although most individuals in
our study exhibit concave utility and convex proba-
bility weighting, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant positive cor-
relation between the two components. In a broader
context, our results provide further evidence that
measuring risk attitude through the curvature of util-
ity alone may not be sufﬁcient to describe decision
making under risk, and that neglecting either of the
two components entails a loss.
Because our aim is to understand the interplay of
utility and probability weighting, a clean measure-
ment of the two components is essential. In this study
we employ the trade-off (TO) method (Wakker and
Deneffe 1996) to measure risk attitude, which is the
only method to date that allows for an independent
measurement of the two components. Among oth-
ers, Abdellaoui (2000), Abdellaoui et al. (2005), and
van de Kuilen and Wakker (2011) have employed the
TO method. In this paper we mostly rely on the TO
method as introduced by Abdellaoui (2000). The rest
of the paper is organized as follows: §2 outlines the
procedure and experimental setup; technical details
are in Appendices A and B. Section 3 contains the
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main results. The paper closes with a discussion and
a conclusion in §§4 and 5, respectively.
2. The TO Method and
Experimental Setup
We restrict ourselves to PT for gains and binary lotter-
ies with objective probabilities. Let xi+1 pxi denote
a prospect yielding xi+1 with probability p and xi oth-
erwise. When xi < xi+1, this prospect is evaluated by
wpuxi+1+ 1− wpuxi in PT, where the utility
function u ·  is assumed to be strictly increasing over
the outcome space 0, and the probability weight-
ing function w ·  is increasing over the probability
space 01, with w0= 0 and w1= 1.
The TO method elicits utility and probability
weights in two consecutive steps. In the ﬁrst step
(UT), a standard sequence of outcomes x1     xn,
i.e., equally spaced outcomes in terms of utility, is
constructed. The second step (PW) uses this stan-
dard sequence to measure probability weights. More
speciﬁcally, in UT an xi+1 is determined to make
the subject indifferent between A	 xi+1 p r and
B	 xi pR, where p, r , and R are exogenous param-
eters, and xi > R > r . With xi+1 at hand, xi+2 is then
varied in a similar way to make the subject indifferent
between A	 xi+2 p r and B	 xi+1 pR. According
to PT, the two indifference relations imply
1−wpuR+wpuxi
= 1−wpur+wpuxi+1 and
1−wpuR+wpuxi+1
= 1−wpur+wpuxi+2
⇒ uxi+2−uxi+1= uxi+1−uxi (1)
Combining the upper two equations leads to Equa-
tion (1), which states that the outcomes xi xi+1xi+2
are equally spaced on the utility axis. Starting with
a certain x0 and constructing recursively n times, we
obtain a standard sequence of x0x1     xn.
In PW, the obtained standard sequence of out-
comes x0x1     xn is used to determine a sequence
of probabilities. For each xi, i = 1    n − 1, a pi is
determined to make the subject indifferent between
a lottery A	 xn pi x0 and a certain outcome B	 xi.
According to PT the indifference implies
wpiuxn+ 1−wpiux0=w1uxi
⇒ wpi=
uxi−ux0
uxn−ux0
 ∀ i= 1    n− 1 (2)
By (1), we know that uxi+1 − uxi is constant,
and the above equation can be simpliﬁed in wpi =
i/n, for i = 1    n − 1. The elicited values of p1
p2     pn−1, along with the fact that wpi= i/n, allow
us to estimate the shape wp.
The experiment was conducted in June 2008 with
124 Jena University undergraduate students.1 We
ﬁxed the parameters at p = 05, r = 0, R = 10, and
x0 = 20. We elicited six points for utility and ﬁve
points for probabilities. Indifference was obtained by
the modiﬁed bisection method, using eight iterations
for each xi, and seven iterations to obtain each pi.2
A consistency check for each xi was carried out by
repeating the seventh choice. For probabilities we
checked for consistency by eliciting a p′3 such that
x3 ∼ x4 p′3x2, which should equal to p3 accord-
ing to PT. This resulted in 54 rounds for the UT part
and 42 rounds for the PW part. One round of each
part was individually selected at random, the pre-
ferred lottery was played, and the resulting amount
was paid privately and individually to the partici-
pant. The average earning was E16, with a min of E8
and max of E46.3
3. Results
3.1. Consistency and Reliability
We repeated the seventh choice pair of each xi to
check for consistency. Preference reversal occurred
in 30% of the cases. This seemingly large num-
ber may originate from the small remaining inter-
val for the inference of xi at the seventh choice4
and is comparable to the ﬁndings in Starmer and
Sugden (1989) (26.5%) and Camerer (1989) (31.6%).
In PW, we checked for consistency by comparing
x6 p3x0∼ x3 and x4 p′3x2 ∼ x3. According to
PT, the two probabilities should be equal (p3 = p′3).
Indeed, the median values of p3 and p′3 are equal to
05, and they are not signiﬁcantly different (paired
Wilcoxon signed rank test p > 010).5
1 We ran four sessions, with 32 subjects in three sessions and
28 subjects in one session. Each session lasted about 90 min-
utes. The experiment included two further parts. Those results are
reported in Qiu and Steiger (2010).
2 A detailed description of the TO and the modiﬁed bisection
method can be found in Appendix A. The procedure to elicit pi was
made variable (seven or nine iterations) to accommodate inconsis-
tent choices. However, this turned out to be unnecessary.
3 We used z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007) for experimental software and
ORSEE (Greiner 2004) to manage invitations to participants. An
English translation of the original instructions can be found in
Appendix B.
4 Note that for x1, when the interval is rather small (the difference
was less than 2), preference reversal occurs in 39% of the cases,
while it lowers to 23% for x6. This suggests that preference reversal
is to some extent the result of small choice intervals. For larger
intervals reversal is reduced yet still remains.
5 The mean difference p3 − p′3 = −0015 and the mean and median
absolute difference are 0.16 and 0.11, respectively. The means are
p3 = 06615 and p′3 = 06766.
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Table 1 Classiﬁcation of Utility
Utility
u Difference Both
Concave 71 67 59
Convex 27 9 6
Linear 26 25 12
Note. The classiﬁcation in the ﬁrst column is according to the area ratio, then
in the second column according to the nonparametric difference method,
and ﬁnally in the third column those classiﬁed in the respective category
according to both criteria.
3.2. Classiﬁcation of Utility Functions
To classify each utility function, we calculated a ratio
(denoted by 
u) of the area above the (linearly nor-
malized) utility function and the rectangular area
between (x00) and (x61).6 This ratio classiﬁed the
concavity, convexity, or linearity of the utility func-
tion in a nonparametric way. For each subject, money
was measured on the x-axis (from x0 to x6) and util-
ity was measured on the y-axis (from 0 to 1, at an
increment of 16 ). We calculated the area above these
points (with linear approximation) and then normal-
ized this measure by dividing the area by 1× x6−x0.
This gave a measure of 
u between 0 and 1, with risk
aversion decreasing with the increase in 
u. We clas-
siﬁed 26 subjects with a 
u between 047 ≤ 
u ≤ 053
as having linear utility functions. With this measure,
71 subjects had concave (
u < 047) and 27 subjects
had convex (
u > 053) utility functions.
As a control, we also employed a nonparamet-
ric difference method to check for robustness of the
above classiﬁcation. Similar to Abdellaoui (2000), we
took the ﬁrst-order difference ′i = xi − xi−1 for i =
1    6 and the second-order difference ′′j = ′j+1 −
′j for j = 1    5. We classiﬁed 67 subjects as con-
cave (with ′′j > 2 for three or more out of ﬁve times),
9 subjects as convex (with ′′j <−2 for three or more
out of ﬁve times), and 25 subjects as linear (with
−2≤ ′′j ≤ 2 for three or more out of ﬁve times). The
remaining 23 subjects could not be classiﬁed with this
method. As shown in Table 1, the majority of sub-
jects was consistent with both classiﬁcation methods,
in particular those with concave utility functions. As
a robustness check we also assumed a power form
utility function ux = x and estimated an  for
each individual with his or her sequence of values
x1x2     x6 using an ordinary least squares regres-
sion logux = Intercept +  logx + , where  ≈
N02. We found that the mean  equals 09316
and the median equals 08744 (standard error equals
00299), and that 74 s are signiﬁcantly different
6 Note that we calculated the area above, not below, the curve, i.e.,
the area between u= 1 and the utility curve. This gives 
u the same
property as  of ux= x: an increase in 
u and  both implies less
risk aversion.
from 1 (at 5% signiﬁcant level), with 58 s signiﬁ-
cantly smaller than 1, and 18 s signiﬁcantly larger
than 1. The two measures (
u and ) are highly
and positively correlated (Spearman’s  = 06877,
p < 001), which supports the use of 
u as a measure
of utility curvature.
3.3. Classiﬁcation of Probability
Weighting Functions
A classiﬁcation of probability weighting requires care-
ful consideration. Previous experiments found mostly
inverse S-shaped, but also S-shaped, linear-, convex-,
and concave-shaped probability weighting functions.
First, we checked each subject’s array of pi for pat-
terns. The pattern of probability weighting is best
discovered when p is close to 0 or 1, where proba-
bility weighting is supposed to be most pronounced.
Thus, a simple way to detect patterns is to com-
pare w1 with p1 and w5 with p5. We classiﬁed a
probability weighting as convex (or optimistic) when
w1 < p1 and w5 < p5, as concave (or pessimistic) when
w1 > p1 and w5 > p5, as inverse S-shaped when w1 >
p1 and w5 < p5, and as S-shaped when w1 < p1 and
w5 > p5. Based on these criteria, 83 subjects were con-
vex, 4 subjects concave, 19 subjects inverse S-shaped,
and 18 subjects S-shaped. Figure 1 gives a boxplot
of the probability weights. The data pattern clearly
favors a convex probability weighting.
Knowing the general pattern of probability weights,
we took the area below the (linearly normalized)
probability weights as a measure of pessimism. We
used probabilities as x-axis (from p1 to p5) and deci-
sion weights as y-axis (from 0 to 1, at an increment
of 16 ). We calculated the area below these points (with
Figure 1 Boxplot of the Probability Weighting
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Table 2 Classiﬁcation of Probability Weighting
Probability weighting
p Nonparametric Both
Convex/optimism 97 Convex 83 77
Concave/pessimism 5 Concave 4 2
Linear 22 S 18 —
Inverse S 19 —
Note. Classiﬁcation ﬁrst according to the area ratio, then according to the
nonparametric method, and ﬁnally those classiﬁed in the respective category
according to both criteria.
linear approximation) to obtain a ratio (denoted by 
p)
between 0 and 1. The magnitude of 
p states whether
a subject, in general, overweights or underweights
probabilities. To highlight the different components
of risk attitudes, we classify subjects as pessimistic,
neutral, and optimistic if their 
u < 047, 047 ≤ 
u ≤
053, and 
u > 053, respectively. With this measure,
97 subjects were pessimistic, 23 subjects were opti-
mistic, and 33 subjects were neutral in probability
weighting. Results and a comparison to the nonpara-
metric method are shown in Table 2. Variations in the
tolerance level did not alter results dramatically.
Because 
p is merely an index of optimism or pes-
simism. It does not capture the degree of inverse S
or S. For robustness check, we also assumed a para-
metric form for the probability weighting function:
wp= p/p + 1− p. This form was introduced
by Goldstein and Einhorn (1987) and has been fre-
quently used. It allows for most common shapes of
probability weighting, depending on the combination
of  and , with  being an index of pessimism and
optimism. With ﬁve data points pi, i= 12345, we
estimated a  and a  for each subject by minimiz-
ing the sums of squared residuals.7 The median of 
equals 0495 (mean = 05679, standard error equals
0.0316) and  equals 088 (mean  = 10468, standard
error equals 0.0627). As we can see from Figure 1, the
ﬁtted curve using median data clearly favors a convex
probability weighting function. The high correlation
between 
p and  (two-sided Spearman’s  = 08746,
p < 001) also suggests that 
p captures probability
weighting reasonably well.
3.4. Central Results
Our main question, to which we now turn, is the
relation between utility curvature and probability
weights. The results are reported in Table 3 and Fig-
ure 2. The largest group in Table 3 are the subjects
with concave utility functions and pessimism in the
probability weighting (55 subjects). This ﬁnding is
convenient for economists, because most theoretical
7 We used a wide range of values,  from 0 to 2 at an increment of
0.01,  from 0 to 4 at an increment of 0.04.
Table 3 The Two Components of Risk Attitudes
Concave u Linear u Convex u Sum
Pessimistic p 55 16 26 97
Neutral p 12 10 0 22
Optimistic p 4 0 1 5
Sum 71 26 27 124
Note. The columns depict the utility and the rows the probability weighting.
models rely on the assumption of risk averse agents.
Our result suggests that the majority of the popula-
tion may indeed be risk averse in both components
(concave in utility and convex in probability weight-
ing). There are further interesting patterns in the data.
The third cell in the ﬁrst row denotes the subjects with
convex utility but pessimistic probability weighting.
They are the second largest group in our classiﬁca-
tion (26 subjects). This is mirrored by the 4 subjects
in the ﬁrst cell of the third row. This cell denotes the
subjects with concave utility but optimistic probabil-
ity weighting.
In light of information obtained on the curvature of
utility and probability weighting, a natural question
is: Are subjects who are more concave in utility also
more convex in probability weighting? To test this
hypothesis, we ran a one-sided Spearman’s  rank
correlation test of 
u and 
p for all subjects. It turned
out that the correlation had the wrong sign and was
not signiﬁcant (Spearman’s  = −01597, p = 09617)!
The subjects with concave utility and convex proba-
bility weighting are those most often assumed in eco-
nomic theories. As shown above, this is the largest
Figure 2 Distribution of the Area Ratios in Utility and Probability
Weighting
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group in our data and most robust to different classiﬁ-
cation methods. However, for those subjects the corre-
lation is not signiﬁcant either (one-sided Spearman’s
rank correlation,  = 00701, p = 06108). Correlating
the parametric estimator  with  gives qualitatively
the same result (one-sided Spearman’s  rank corre-
lation test between  and , = 00761 and p= 02004
for all subjects, and =−00656 and p= 0317 for sub-
jects who are risk averse in both components).
A more general illustration of our main result is
shown in Figure 2. Here the relation between 
u and

p is plotted for each subject. The x-axis depicts 
u
and the y-axis depicts 
p. Small 
p values correspond
to pessimism in probability weighting, and small 
u
values correspond to concave utility. The lower left
square represents the largest group of subjects with
pessimistic/convex risk attitude. As we can see, no
positive correlation between 
u and 
p is apparent.
4. Discussion
The TO method requires questions to be chained. It
is known that this can give subjects incentives to not
answer truthfully (Harrison 1986). In theory, subjects
could increase their expected payoff by pretending to
be more risk averse. Yet, this does not seem to be a
practical problem. van de Kuilen and Wakker (2011),
who also employed the TO method, found subjects
in postexperimental interviews to be unaware of the
chained structure, let alone the manipulation possibil-
ities. In our data, we checked for possible manipula-
tion by comparing the reported xi with the possible
upper range of xi. By our experimental design this
ratio equals 067 for a risk-neutral agent.8 If, however,
subjects reported their x′i strategically, this ratio would
be close to 1. Our data shows that the mean of the
ratios is 080, which is consistent with a reasonable
degree of risk aversion.
One may ﬁnd it surprising that in our study we
have mostly convex probability weighting functions,
whereas in most previous literature inverse S was
prevalent—the more so because we used the same
method as Abdellaoui (2000), who found inverse S to
be prevailing. We have no conclusive explanation for
this difference. But we suspect that it might be related
to experimental procedure, subject pool, stake size,
and payment method.9 Abdellaoui (2000) used small
group interviews with subjects who were acquainted
with probabilities and expectations, whereas we used
group sessions with subjects of diversiﬁed back-
grounds. He also used a much larger stake size (out-
comes between US$200 and US$4,000) but paid only
1 out of 46 subjects on the basis of their decisions,
whereas we used outcomes between 1 and 5 euros,
8 For more detailed information, refer to Appendix A.
9 Unfortunately, we could not use the data of Abdellaoui (2000) for
comparison because this data has been lost.
and paid all subjects on the basis of their decisions.
Another explanation is that the inverse S could not be
detected, because the ﬁrst weight elicited was 16 . Our
results are not unique though. van de Kuilen (2009)
and van de Kuilen and Wakker (2011) found similar
results. Thus, the shape of probability weighting is
perhaps not as clear as we thought, and more research
needs to be done.
For a robust check of our central hypothesis, we
also analyzed Bleichrodt and Pinto’s (2000) data.
Bleichrodt and Pinto (2000) mainly found inverse
S-shaped probability weighting. We calculated 
u and

p for their data. The one-sided Spearman’s  rank
correlation test between 
u and 
p gives qualitatively
the same result: =−04328 (p= 0999). We assumed
a power form ux = x for utility functions and
wp = p/p + 1− p for probability weighting
functions, and we estimated the , , and  by min-
imizing the sum of squared residuals. The one-sided
Spearman’s  rank correlation test between  and 
gives qualitatively the same result:  = −04469 (p =
09993). These results suggest that our result is neither
limited to our data nor to the shape of the probability
weighting function.
5. Conclusion
In view of numerous studies exploring risk attitudes,
it is now probably less controversial to argue that risk
attitudes have two components. Yet to the best of our
knowledge, no study has so far addressed the relation
between these two components of risk. This question
is important because PT would have been a less sig-
niﬁcant challenge to EU if the curvature of utility and
probability weighting had been strongly correlated.
In this paper, we elicited risk attitudes using the
trade-off method. We classiﬁed utility and probability
weighting for each individual subject and analyzed
the relation between the two components. We found
that, although most individuals exhibit concave util-
ity and convex probability weighting, the two compo-
nents show no positive correlation. This suggests that
the curvature of utility alone is an insufﬁcient proxy
for risk attitudes, and that an accurate account of risk
attitudes requires the measurement of both.
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Appendix A. The (Modiﬁed) Bisection
Choice Procedure
The detailed algorithm of the (modiﬁed) bisection choice
procedure is as follows:
1. Given xi, we set a range for xi+1’s indifference value.
This range should be large enough to include potential
indifference values for xi, and it should be small enough to
allow for a good inference of the indifference point. We used
the following equation to determine this potential range:
x=max0 xi +R · 05− r (A1)
x¯= xi +R · 15− r (A2)
The determination of this range reﬂects the combined con-
sideration of ﬂexibility and efﬁciency. Let xm = x+ x¯/2
denote the middle point of the interval x x¯. Subjects were
ﬁrst presented with a pair of lotteries: A= xi0510 and
B = xi+1050, with xi+1 = xm. To ease calculations only
integers were allowed. When xi is not an even integer, the
closest even integer larger than xi is taken.
2. If A is preferred, we know that xi+1 must be increased
to achieve indifference. We thus let xi+1 = xm + x¯/2. Like-
wise, if B is preferred, xi+1 must be decreased. We then let
xi+1 = xm + x/2.
3. Repeating this procedure four more times, the interval
containing the indifference point will become rather small.
Finally, we choose the middle point of the ﬁnal interval to
be xi+1.
A drawback of the bisection procedure is that it is not
entirely incentive compatible. If subjects are aware of the
entire experimental procedure from the start, they may have
an incentive to strategically misreport their choices. To see
this, note that pretending to be overly risk averse, i.e.,
choosing A all the time, raises xi+1 and thus increases the
mean payoff of prospects B. Because subjects are paid their
preferred prospect in one randomly chosen pair, this misre-
porting strategy may increase their expected experimental
payoff. To make it more difﬁcult to fully grasp the bisection
procedure, we added two choices at the beginning elicita-
tion procedure. Therefore, in total, eight choices were taken
to elicit each point. The display of these two choices is inde-
pendent from participant’s choices and is expected to make
the inference of the whole algorithm more difﬁcult.
The procedure may be best understood with a numer-
ical example. In the experiment, we started the elicitation
with the following pair of prospects: A= 200510∼ B=
x1050. The potential range of x1 is 1545. Participants
will then face the sequence of choices shown in Table A.1.
Table A.1 Illustration of the Modiﬁed Bisection Choice Procedure
No. Alternatives Choice Inference
1 A= 200510 vs. B = 30050 A x1 ∈ 3045	
2 A= 200510 vs. B = 24050 A x1 ∈ 3045	
3 A= 200510 vs. B = 38050 A x1 ∈ 3845	
4 A= 200510 vs. B = 34050 A x1 ∈ 3845	
5 A= 200510 vs. B = 41050 B x1 ∈ 3841	
6 A= 200510 vs. B = 39050 A x1 ∈ 3941	
7 A= 200510 vs. B = 40050 A x1 ∈ 4041	
8 A= 200510 vs. B = 41050 B x1 ∈ 4041	
Based on these choices, x1 is set equal to the middle point
of the ﬁnal range 4041, that is, 40.5. If subjects choose A
all the way, we simply set x1 equal to the upper bound of
the initial range, which is 45.10
Elicitation of probability weights was carried out in a
similar manner. For each pi, we ﬁrst presented subjects with
a ﬁxed sequence of ﬁve pairs of prospects of structure A=
x6 pi x0 and B= xi pi xi, where pi is successively set to
0109030705. Having ﬁnished these sequences for all
xi, i= 1    5, we proceeded with the bisection procedure.
If there was only one switching point for pi, two further
iterations would be employed to ﬁnd the point of indiffer-
ence. If there were two or more switching points, an inter-
val encompassing all switching points would be determined
and a maximum of four iterations of the bisection procedure
was employed to ﬁnd out the indifference probability.
Appendix B. Experimental Instructions
The experiment was carried out in June 2008 in the com-
puterized laboratory of the Max Planck Institute in Jena.
We ran four sessions, with 32 subjects in three sessions and
28 subjects in one session. Each session lasted about 90 min-
utes. Participants could not observe each other’s choices.
Rounds for payment were chosen individually, and partic-
ipants were paid out privately and individually at the end
of the experiment.
B.1. General Information
Thank you for participating in our experiment. Please end
all conversations now and switch off your cell phone. Please
read the instructions carefully. The money you earn will
depend on the choice you make. The money will be paid to
you in cash at the end of the experiment. Throughout the
experiment, we shall speak of ECU (experimental currency
units) rather than euro. The exchange rate between ECU
and euro is ﬁxed to 20 ECU= 1 euro. Please do not commu-
nicate during the experiment, and raise your hand if you
have questions. We will answer your questions individually.
It is very important that you obey these rules, because we
would otherwise be forced to exclude you from the experi-
ment and hence from payment.
The experiments consists of four parts. Each part consists
of several rounds. In each round you have to make a deci-
sion. At the end of the experiment, one round of each part
is selected for payment. The sum of these four payments
will be your ﬁnal payment.
B.2. Instructions for the UT Experiment
The ﬁrst part of the experiment comprises 42 rounds. In
each round, you will be presented with a pair of risky alter-
natives. Your task is to pick your preferred alternative. To
make the comparisons easier, the payoffs are also presented
in the upper right corner of the screen. The pairs of risky
alternatives will have the following format.
The alternatives shown in Figure B.1 can be better under-
stood by using the following thinking. Imagine a big watch
10 For the current example, one may ﬁnd eight choices are too much.
For later rounds, this will be necessary because xi increases with
sequence and so does the potential range of xi .
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Figure B.1 Illustration of the Lottery Display in the UT Experiment
Alternative A Alternative B
300 ECU
100 ECU
40%
60%
200 ECU
50 ECU
40%
60%
40%
60%
with one arm. In the ﬁgure, 40% of the panel is covered by
black and 60% of the panel is covered by white. The arm of
the watch stops equally likely at each position of the watch.
Suppose now you have chosen alternative A from the above
pair. Then, if the arm stops in the black area, you are paid
300 ECU, if the arm stops in the white area, you are paid
100 ECU. (Equivalently, had you chosen B you would be
paid 200 ECU in case of black and 50 ECU in case of white.)
At the end of this part of the experiment, one of your
choices will be randomly selected and played, and the
resulting outcome will be your experimental earning in
this part.
B.3. Instructions for the PW Experiment
This part is similar to the ﬁrst part. Again you will be asked
for your preference between two lotteries, the difference
being that lottery B always gives a ﬁxed payoff. Another
difference is that the probabilities in lottery A change for
each decision. Using the picture of the ﬁrst part, the division
of the circle between black and white changes for each deci-
sion. Please think carefully before each decision, because a
conﬁrmed choice cannot be changed.
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